Abstract. We consider option hedging and pricing for a large agent. The large agent affects the market's demand-supply equilibrium and, therefore, the market prices of financial instruments. By assuming a specific large agent's effect function for the underlying asset we derive the corresponding effect function for call options on that asset. As we show, the price of a call option in our model is the solution to a Black-Scholes partial differential equation with a modified terminal condition. Finally we estimate our model parameters from option market data.
Option hedging under a large trader has previously been considered, e.g. in Jarrow [J] , Frey [F] , Sircar and Papanicolaou [SP] , Cvitanic and Ma [CM] , Bank and Baum [BB] , Jonsson and Keppo [JK] , Cetin, Jarrow, and Protter [CJP] , and Cetin, Jarrow, Protter, and Warachka [CJPW] . In [J] , the model used is a binomial tree model, the continuous-time version of which is studied in [F] , where existence and uniqueness of hedging solutions for a large agent are proven. In [SP] , the authors consider option pricing with increased volatility arising from hedging activity. Bank and Baum [BB] give no arbitrage conditions in the presence of a large trader for markets driven by a family of semimartingales. They also show how to compute superreplication prices.
The papers [SP] and [F] divide the market players into two groups: large (program) traders and small (reference) traders. The underlying asset price dynamics is derived from: 1) the market shares for these two groups, 2) the inverse demand curve of small traders, and 3) the stochastic risk factor of the small traders' demand. In [BB] , [CJP] , [CJPW] , [JK] and [CM] , on the other hand, the authors directly model how the large agent impacts the underlying asset price and compute option prices on these assets. Further, in [JK] the asset holdings are computed from a equilibrium consideration with large and small traders.
The present paper is closest in spirit to [CJP] , [CJPW] , [JK] , and [CM] . However, we model the large agent effect and the corresponding portfolio wealth differently than in [CM] and [JK] in that the trading activities of the large agent directly affect the portfolio value, and not only the parameters in the SDE for the portfolio value. On the other hand, the analysis in [CJPW] (see also [CJP] ), developed independently, is quite similar to ours.
As mentioned earlier, we estimate our model parameters from IBM option prices and show that the implied parameters are significant. The exponential effect function that we use was introduced in Keppo [Ke] , who considered single agent optimality and market game equilibrium in the case of large agents. Optimal consumption and investment for a large agent were also studied in [CC] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 1 we define the framework used in the paper and calculate the wealth processes of the large agent. Section 2 contains the derivation of the partial differential equation for the call option price, and Section 3 an analysis of the solution. In Section 4 we compute market implied parameters. Finally Section 5 concludes.
The market and the wealth of a large agent
We consider a market consisting of a risk-free asset B (bond) and a risky asset (stock). The bond follows the dynamics dB B = r dt, where risk-free rate r is constant. The dynamics of the stock is complicated by the presence of a (single) large agent whose trading activities affect the market price of the stock. More precisely, the market stock price derives from two sources. First, there is an underlying risk factor process s which follows geometric Brownian motion, i.e. ds s = µ dt + σ dW, where µ and σ are constant and W is Brownian motion. We will sometimes refer to s as the small agent stock price, for reasons that will be apparent shortly. The stock price S that is observed in the market is then given by
where a is the number of stocks currently held by the large agent and g ≥ 0 is an effect parameter. We will assume g > 0 so that the trading activities of the large agent has a definite effect on the market price. Thus, the more the agent buys the more he/she pays, and the more the agent sells the lower the price received. This effect function is consistent with previous empirical studies (Loeb [Lo] ; Kraus and Stoll [KS] ; Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers [HML] ; Keim and Madhavan [KM] ). According to e.g. Loeb [Lo] , the large agent parameter g depends on the market capitalization and the liquidity of the market. In the limiting case g = 0, the "large" agent is just another agent and S = s, explaining the name small agent stock price.
Suppose the large agent is holding a stocks and b bonds. The wealth of the large agent is defined as the wealth after all stock positions have been cleared. As the large agent is selling (buying) stocks, the market stock price goes down (up) . Assuming that the stocks are sold (or bought) in infinitesimal portions, we get the following formula for the wealth V of the large agent holding a stocks at market value S and b bonds at market value B:
If the large agent is trading in a self-financing (see e.g. Björk [B] ) way, then the same reasoning yields
2. Option pricing I: derivation of the PDE
We now derive a partial differential equation for the unit option price in our large agent framework. In the next section we analyze some properties of its solutions.
2.1. Assumptions. We assume that the (single) large agent is short k ≥ 0 European call options with strike price K and expiration date T . Due to the large agent effect it is necessary to be precise about the meaning of the call option contract: it means that the holder of the option has the right to receive h stocks at time T from the large agent for a payment of $hK, where h ∈ [0, k] is a number chosen by the holder of the options. This is typically not the same as receiving h(S − K) + in cash at time T , since the positions (and hence the price of the stock) of the large agent might change at time T .
The large agent effect implies a particular risk of holding stocks for a small agent (the market price could immediately change due to a sell-off by the large agent). Hence we assume that the holder of the options has the right to immediately sell the h stocks back to the large agent and receive S 0 −h e gy dy in cash. In fact, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the small agent always does this, since he/she could always buy back the stocks later on.
To get a unique price of the option we have to make further assumptions. The large agent is hedging the call options by trading in the underlying asset (stock) and risk-free instrument. We assume that at any given time, all of the agent's stock holding is used for the hedging and we further assume that the large agent is ∆-neutral at any time t ∈ [0, T [. We also require that at the terminal time, immediately before exercise, the large agent owns exactly h stocks, where h ∈ [0, k] is the number of options that the holder chooses (optimally) to exercise.
To summarize, we look for a self-financing trading strategy for the large agent that accomplishes the following:
• the large agent is ∆-neutral at any time t ∈ [0, T [; • immediately before exercise the large agent holds h ∈ [0, k] stocks;
• at exercise the large agent gives the option holder the amount s h 0 e gy dy − hK in cash (notice that S = se gh );
• the number h maximizes the value of the option s h 0 e gy dy − hK on the interval [0, k]. We will show that such a trading strategy exists (uniquely) and thus determines the price of the option. Generally speaking we will find the option price C(s, t) as a function of the small agent stock price s, rather than the observed stock price S.
It will be demonstrated below that the large agent effect depends only on the product of the large agent parameter and the number of options hedged. Therefore we introduce Definition 2.1. The total large agent parameter γ is defined by γ = gk, where g is the large agent parameter and k is the number of options being hedged.
2.2. The terminal condition. Let us first find the price of the option at the terminal time T , immediately before exercise. By our assumptions the large agent is then holding h stocks, with h ∈ [0, k]. Hence S = se gh . At exercise the large agent hands over the h stocks for a payment of hK. The stock price is then s. Subsequently, the large agent buys back the stocks for a payment of s h 0 e gy dy in cash. It follows that the unit price of the k options is given by φ(h * ) = max{φ(h) | h ∈ [0, k]}, where
We see that φ (h) = sh k e gh ≥ 0, so φ is convex, implying that the maximum of φ must occur at one of the boundary points h = 0 or h = k. In fact it is easy to see that the maximum occurs at h = 0 if s < Kγ e γ −1 and at h = k if s > Kγ e γ −1 , where γ = gk is the total large agent parameter (see Definition 2.1). Notice that φ(0) = 0 and φ(k) = s γ (e γ − 1) − K. Therefore, the unit price of the options at time T is given by
Notice that when γ → 0, i.e. g → 0 or k → 0, then C(s, T ; γ) → (s − K) + , the Black-Scholes terminal condition. We also see that it is always optimal for the holder of the option to exercise all or none of the options, depending on whether the quantity in (2.1) is positive or not.
2.3. The PDE. We now proceed to derive the PDE for the unit option price C(s, t; γ), where t < T and γ = gk is the total large agent parameter. To find an equation for C, we try to find an instantaneously riskless, self-financing portfolio Π containing the short option positions and k∆ = k∆(s, t) stocks. The value of such a portfolio is Π = −kC + k∆s, where k∆ is given by (1.1). By Itô, and by (1.2) this portfolio follows the dynamics
This is riskless if and only if the ds-terms cancel, which gives k∆ = k ∂C ∂s , amounting to
where γ = gk as before. Further, if the ds-terms in (2.2) cancel, then we are left with
The no-arbitrage condition dΠ = rΠ dt then implies that
or, after rearranging, using (2.3)
In other words, C(s, t) satisfies the usual Black-Scholes PDE. Let us summarize:
Proposition 2.2. Under the assumptions above, the unit option price C(s, t) of k European call options with strike price K and expiration date T is given by the solution to the Black-Scholes PDE (2.4) with the terminal condition
where γ = gk is the total large agent parameter. The hedging ratio is given by (2.3).
Notice that s is not the market price of the stock, but the small agent price. As γ → 0, i.e. g → 0 or k → 0, then∆ = ∆ = C s and the situation is exactly standard Black-Scholes.
Option pricing II: properties of the solution
We now analyze the properties of the solution to the option pricing PDE derived above. By linearity of the Black-Scholes equation we may express the function C(s, t; γ) in terms of the standard BlackScholes solutions. If C * (s, t) = C * (s, t; K) denotes the (small agent) price of a call option, then we have
where
and hence C(s, t; γ) = αC
for all t ≤ T by linearity of the Black-Scholes PDE. Also, from (2.3) we get
where ∆ * denotes the Black-Scholes Delta.
3.1. The option price as a function of the small agent stock price. We now investigate how the unit option price C and hedging ratio ∆ depend on the parameter γ = gk. We consider the small agent stock price s as fixed (which means that the market stock price S is not necessarily fixed).
Proposition 3.1. The unit option price C(s, t; γ) is an increasing function of the total large agent parameter γ = gk.
Proof. This follows from the maximum principle [E, PW] and the fact that the terminal condition
is an increasing function of γ.
In a similar vein we have the following result, which implies Proposition 3.1 Proposition 3.2. The unit hedging ratio ∆(s, t) = ∆(s, t; γ) is an increasing function of the total large agent parameter γ = gk.
The proof is based on (3.1) and the following computational lemma.
Lemma 3.3. For any a ∈ (0, 1) the function γ → γ −1 log(1 + a(e γ − 1)) is strictly increasing in γ.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The case when t = T is easy and left to the reader. Let us assume t < T . By (3.1) and the Black-Scholes formulas we have
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. The function φ(ξ) = (1 + ξ) log(1 + ξ) is convex for ξ > 0 and satisfies φ(0) = 0. Hence ξ → φ(ξ)/ξ is strictly decreasing for ξ > 0. Now write v(γ) = γ −1 log(1+a(e γ −1)) and ξ = e γ −1. Then γ a v (γ) = e γ 1 + a(e γ − 1) − log (1 + a(e γ − 1)) aγ
which completes the proof. Figure 1 . Option pricing for a large agents. The three different curves show the unit option price C(s, t; γ) (left) and unit hedging ratio ∆(s, t; γ) (right), where γ = gk, as a function of the small agent price s for three different values of γ: γ = 0 (solid), γ = 0.05 (dashed) and γ = 0.1 (dotted). The other parameters were T −t = 0.2, r = 0.04, σ = 0.2, K = 100. Notice that both C and ∆ are increasing functions of γ. See Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
3.2. The option price as a function of the market stock price. As we have seen in Proposition 3.1, the option price C(s, t) is an increasing function of γ = gk when the small agent stock price s is held fixed. We emphasize again that s is not the observed stock price. Rather, this price is given by S = se γ∆(s,t) , where ∆(s, t) is gotten from (2.3). We obtain
Now, for fixed t, γ we have the following properties of C(s, t): 0 < C s < α, C s → 0 as s → 0, and
Hence, given an S we may find the corresponding s and compute the unit option price C(S, t).
Observe that since for fixed s, both S and C increase with γ it is not obvious that C(S, t) will be increasing in γ for fixed S. Indeed, the numerical computation illustrated in Figure 2 shows that in fact C(S, t) has a complicated dependence on γ. The same is true for the unit hedging ratio ∆(S, t; γ). Figure 2 . Option pricing for a large agents. The three different curves show the unit option price C(S, t; γ) (left) and unit hedging ratio ∆(S, t; γ) (right), where γ = gk, as a function of the observed market price S for three different values of γ: γ = 0 (solid), γ = 0.05 (dashed) and γ = 0.1 (dotted). The other parameters were T −t = 0.2, r = 0.04, σ = 0.2, K = 100.
Empirical Analysis
As mentioned earlier, the existence of the large agent price effect has already been empirically proved in several papers, mostly using stock price data (see e.g. [Lo] ). Here we estimate the large agent effect from option market prices by using our pricing model.
We use least squares for calculating the model's implied parameters. More precisely, suppose we are given the prices at times t 1 , . . . , t n of M options. Let θ be the vector of parameters that define our model. We divide the n times into m ≤ n consecutive periods, each of which contains n l > 0 (l = 1, 2, ..., m) distinct times. Our goal is to come up with an estimate for θ for each group l.
LetĈ j (t i ) denote the observed price of the j-th option at time t i . Let C j (t; θ) denote the model price of the j-th option with parameter value θ. For each period l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, we define the best fit parameter set,θ l , by
Repeating this m times gives us a sequence of parameter setsθ 1 , . . . ,θ m .
We use all IBM call and put options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange during 1991-1995 to estimate the implied model parameters. However, we do not consider options that were traded less than 25 days per year. We use a one hour time interval and divide each year's data into 6 periods, each containing about 340 consecutive trading hours. Thus, we obtain a total of 30 sets of estimated parameters from the 5 years data. The risk free rate is assumed to be 3%, approximating the rate on the 4-week treasury bill during 1991-1995.
The option price in our model depends on the risk factor dynamics and the parameter γ. Now γ in turn depends on the large agent parameter g and the number of options hedged. The parameter g is the same for all the options during the same period l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} but the number of options is usually different for different options. Thus, we set
where σ is the constant volatility of s and for 1 ≤ i ≤ M the variable γ i = gk i is the total large effect parameter (see Definition 2.1) for option i. That is, in each period we calculate the implied volatility and the total large agent effect of each option in the market. Using least squares estimation 30 times Figure 3 contains a histogram of γ and it also shows that all the estimated γ-parameters are greater than 0. Thus, based on the IBM options data, the large agent effect is significant. In fact our empirical results imply a strong large agent effect. For example, if we assume that γ is equal to its mean value 0.0192 then it changes call option prices on average by 11.18%. Further, the hedging of all call options with the same strike price and maturity changes the underlying asset price on average by 1.57%.
Conclusions
We have analyzed pricing and hedging of call options in a model where a large agent influences market prices through an exponential price effect function. In this model, the option price is a function of not only the underlying asset price but also of the number of options sold (and hedged).
Using a hedging argument we showed that the price of the call option in our model is a solution to the usual Black-Scholes partial differential equation, but with a modified terminal condition, which takes into effect the option amount and the parameter measuring the "size" of the large agent. Put option prices can then be calculated using put-call-parity.
We analyzed the solution to the partial differential equation. In particular we showed that if we fix the "small agent" price of the asset, then the unit option price and the unit hedging ratio are increasing functions of the number of options hedged, as well as of the large agent effect parameter. On the other hand, if we freeze the actual (large agent) market price, then the dependence is more complicated.
Finally we estimated the model parameters from IBM option prices and showed that the market implied parameters are significant. This is consistent with the earlier empirical papers that have analyzed the large agent effect using stock prices.
